Science / Religion

Autopoiesis, Epigenetic Mechanisms, and Punctuated Theory

Autopoiesis, Epigenetic Mechanisms, and Punctuated Theory

Abstract

This chapter provides a scientific analysis of the deep structure of conserved core processes and facilitated variation, exploring the adaptation of organisms in interaction with their environment. A structural theory of life emergence and evolution (structural drift) offers a crucial framework for the public theology of science, advancing biomedical justice, biopolitics, and public health, as reflected in the social and cultural realities of stratification. The scientific system, within its autopoietic community, cannot be separated from other referential systems through a bio-sociological analysis of the interface between biological life and the social-ecological constellation. It features autopoietic life in terms of epigenetic ontology, articulated as self-referential circularity (the deep structure of core conserved processes), facilitated variations, adaptability through linkages and metabolic pathways, and the conservation of an organism’s adaptation in socio-biological interaction. Public theology engages with the social and cultural functions of science, aiming to bring forth a meaningful world through the systemic construction of life forms, with a focus on justice for the common good and prolepsis in the anticipatory politics of meaning.

Introduction

In eukaryotic cells, DNA is wrapped around histone protein octamers to form structural units called nucleosomes, which are connected by stretches of linker DNA. This arrangement—often described as a “beads-on-a-string” structure—is further compacted into a more tightly wound form known as the chromatin fiber.

Chromatin remodeling complexes are multi-protein machines that utilize energy to dynamically alter chromatin structure. These complexes harness the chemical energy released during ATP hydrolysis (the breakdown of ATP by water) to power cellular processes that reposition, evict, or restructure nucleosomes. By doing so, they regulate access to specific regions of DNA, influencing gene expression.

Chromatin remodeling complexes often interact with histone-modifying enzymes, which recognize specific tail modifications on histone proteins. These modifications act as signals that guide the remodeling complexes to particular sites. Once bound, the complexes help to open the chromatin structure, making the underlying DNA accessible to the transcriptional machinery. Notably, many of these complexes also possess intrinsic enzymatic activity, allowing them to directly participate in the regulation of gene expression.[1]

The chromatin regulatory structure is deeply integrated into diverse cellular functions, enabling each operation while also intersecting with broader social and ecological factors. For instance, histone-modifying enzymes can slide nucleosomes along the DNA to new positions. This sliding exposes or conceals specific DNA sequences without significantly unwinding the DNA itself.

In some cases, nucleosomes are entirely removed (evicted) from the DNA, making large stretches of DNA accessible to regulatory factors and the transcriptional machinery. Additionally, histone core subunits can be exchanged for different variants, altering the properties and behavior of the nucleosome, which in turn affects gene regulation.

Beyond chromatin remodeling, metabolic pathways like glycolysis demonstrate how cellular processes are tightly regulated. In glycolysis, glucose is partially broken down through a series of enzyme-controlled reactions, beginning with substrate binding to the enzyme’s active site. These reactions proceed in a cyclic manner, releasing products and generating energy. This process primarily occurs in the cytoplasm (and in some steps within mitochondria or cellular membranes), producing ATP, which enzymes use to drive catalytic reactions essential for cellular function.

Within the chromatin regulatory structure, gene expression is tightly controlled at every stage of a gene’s life cycle. The cell not only regulates when genes are transcribed and translated but also modulates the speed and duration of these processes, ensuring precise and dynamic control over protein production.[2]

Beyond nucleosome repositioning, covalent histone modifications occur when enzymes add or remove chemical tags—such as acetyl, methyl, or phosphate groups—to histone proteins, particularly on their histone tails. Acetylation typically loosens the chromatin structure by reducing the positive charge on histones, weakening their interaction with the negatively charged DNA. This loosening is generally associated with increased gene expression.

Methylation, on the other hand, creates docking sites for other proteins, influencing chromatin structure and gene activity in a highly variable and context-dependent manner. Phosphorylation also alters the charge of histones and plays key roles in DNA repair processes, as well as in the extreme condensation of DNA required during mitosis and meiosis.

Epigenetics is the study of how gene expression is regulated at the chromatin level through such modifications. Notably, these epigenetic marks can influence gene accessibility to the transcription machinery and, in some cases, can be inherited by offspring, passing regulatory information across generations.[3] 

Gene activity is regulated by a combination of proteins known as histone-modifying enzymes and chromatin-remodeling complexes, which function within conserved core processes and enable variation in cellular mechanisms and metabolic pathways.

Building on the punctuated theory of cellular evolution, I propose a redefinition of autopoiesis as the self-referential recycling occurring within the chromatin regulatory structure—an interface that interacts with other referential activities, particularly those involved in the socio-ecological complexity of epigenetic methylation. This perspective links autopoiesis with enacted embodiment, a key feature of neurophenomenology, contributing to a structural theory of multiple lifelines.

I view many epigenetic studies as vital components of the conserved core processes, reflecting lived experience through the restructuring of epigenetic self-referential mechanisms across a broader spectrum. The epigenetic approach highlights the interaction between DNA sequence-specific transcription factors and RNA polymerases, mediated through histone modifications.

Indeed, the DNA code itself is wrapped around histones and marked by epigenetic signatures within the organism. These mechanisms are well understood at the molecular level, particularly through histone modifications and chromatin remodeling processes. Histone modification often involves methylation of cytosine bases, which is regulated by interactions with histone tails, and this methylation plays a critical role in modulating gene expression.

The complexity of metabolism emerges from the multiple uses of a relatively small set of conserved elements, which are combined in diverse ways to produce varying functional outcomes. In this way, conservation operates alongside combinatorial economy, enabling diversification.[4]

Given the structure of chromatin remodeling complexes, the autopoietic living system functions as a self-referential circularity (a deep structure of core conserved processes), embedded within networks of metabolic linkages and pathways (which facilitate variation), while also interacting with the environment through structural coupling and responses to socio-ecological factors (forming a biosociological regime). A bio-sociological analysis of society, culture, and ecology emphasizes autopoietic being through an epigenetic ontology, positioned at the interface between biological life and social-cultural life.

Epigenetic Ontology and Systems Theory

Epigenetic marks or signatures refer to changes in DNA methylation or histone modifications that regulate gene activity without altering the underlying DNA sequence. Sociological studies of epigenetics examine how socioeconomic adversity or exposure to polluted environments can contribute to adverse public health outcomes through these epigenetic mechanisms.

Research in this field focuses on DNA methylation in various genes as a mediating factor that helps explain the relationship between social exposures and disease outcomes. Social environmental challenges—such as safety concerns, food insecurity, and exposure to environmental toxicants—are critical factors influencing these epigenetic changes.

Additionally, sociological research explores transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, analyzing how environmental impacts can be transmitted through epigenetic marks across generations, thereby linking social conditions with biological outcomes over time.[5]

This duality of epigenetic signature and inheritance points to a biosociological regime of epigenetic ontology rooted in autopoietic self-referential circularity, and its structural drift with the environment in the history of the conservation of an organism’s adaptability. This introduces a new dimension to evolutionary theory through triadic signatures: the core conserved structure of self-referential circularity, facilitated variations, and the conservation of adaptability in the history of structural drift. This epistemic stance is distinct from the system-theoretical paradigm of communication with the environment, particularly in its emphasis on functional differentiation.

Luhmann’s theory of social systems is fundamentally grounded in the concept of self-referential systems, though it also acknowledges elements such as structural coupling and systemic irritation. His thesis is presented in a highly general and abstract sense: “There are systems that have the ability to establish relations with themselves and to differentiate these relations from relations with their environment.”[6]

In fact, Luhmann’s systems-theoretical position cannot be reduced to process thinking, as it remains deeply engaged with the environment and emphasizes operational closure, systemic boundaries, and functional differentiation. His theory focuses on how autopoietic systems create and maintain themselves by selectively reducing the overwhelming complexity of their environments in order to function effectively.

Within this framework, process is understood as a functional component of the system’s autopoiesis, rather than as a fundamental ontological reality grounded in events or moments of becoming, as seen in process philosophy or occasional ontology.

While structural coupling and irritation are central to Luhmann’s theory, they serve the purpose of reducing environmental complexity through functional differentiation. This contrasts with process thinking, which conceives of reality as an “interacting network of individual moments of experience,”[7] emphasizing the relational, emergent, and interconnected nature of life within a subjectivist-experiential metanarrative. Process philosophy highlights complexity not as something to be reduced, but as an expression of the intricate web of interdependent experiences that constitute the fabric of reality in the ecological web of life.

On the contrary, Luhmann’s commitment to a general theory of systems—centered on operational closure, cybernetic epistemology, and functional differentiation—places excessive emphasis on self-referential autonomy, without sufficiently addressing the epigenetic interface. His framework seeks to establish a universal sociological theory through systems-theoretical analysis of binary oppositions, such as static versus dynamic, structure versus process, or Gesellschaft versus Gemeinschaft.[8]

While one may appreciate Luhmann’s analytical use of such binaries, his model tends to overlook the inherent conflict of interpretation that arises in lived social realities. In contrast, a structural theory of lifelines is situated within a general-relativist framework, grounded in the lifeworld and connected to language games, diverse forms of life, and the politics of autopoiesis with an ethical revolution.

Rather than aiming for closed-system universality, it seeks to account for the emergence of life at a poised threshold—where the common good and a politics of recognition converge. This perspective emphasizes symbiosis, embodied experience, and enactive meaning-making as essential to understanding social systems, moving toward a vision of life as co-constructed and ecologically embedded.

Furthermore, the research program of epigenetic science challenges the foundational assumptions of Luhmann’s general theory of social systems—particularly the insistence that “all systems-theoretical analysis must begin with the distinction between system and environment.”[9]

Life Interfaced with Biopolitics

I do not disagree with the system-environment paradigm or functional differentiation, but I problematize its lack of conceptual clarity in addressing the shared reality of the lifeworld, in which agents participate in diverse realities and the systemic construction of forms of life. The system-environment paradigm cannot dispense with the human being as an autopoietic living existence, embodied within systemic reality, and enacting the creation of a meaningful world through cybernetic communication, democracy, radical self-renewal, ethics of participation, and constructivism.

In fact, the epigenetic paradigm suspends the binary code by revealing how biological and social environments can become materially inscribed within the system itself, thereby blurring the very boundaries that systems theory seeks to maintain. “Without difference from an environment,” Luhmann argues, “there would not even be self-reference, because difference is the functional premise of self-referential operations.” [10] While I do not reject the systems-theoretical position entirely, my thesis is that social-environmental complexity is already embedded within the epistemology of self-referential systems—particularly as it operates through the deep structure of conserved core processes, such as the chromatin regulatory structure. In this view, the environment is not simply external to the system but is materially and operationally coupled with it, challenging rigid distinctions between system and environment and opening space for a more intersectional understanding of life, embodiment, the structural drift of life, and the social-ecological interface.

Within the cellular network and regulatory process, genes—understood as DNA molecules—are subject to modification, elimination, and editing by the regulating system. Gene activity is governed by cellular and tissue-level controls, which determine when and how frequently genes are transcribed, as well as when their expression should cease.

This dynamic reflects a form of downward causation, where higher-order structures influence gene expression and function. Such holistic supervenience contrasts with ‘bottom-up’ gene-centric reductionism, which attributes causal primacy solely to genetic sequences.[11]

A systemic view of downward causation or supervenience offers a more nuanced understanding of mechanisms, avoiding the radical dualism between mind and body or the reductionism of monism. In this view, an epigenetic mark, such as histone modification, is particularly understood in relation to the methylation of cytosine bases. This methylation process is mediated by interactions at the histone tails—docking sites where external elements such as diet, pharmaceuticals, or environmental pollutants can influence gene expression and overall health outcomes.

It is important to highlight the intersection between self-referential systems and other-referential encroachments, which together constitute the multiple realities of life within the self-regulating complexity that underlies autopoietic living organisms and their embodiment. At the cellular level, such encroachment occurs through various environmental and social factors that affect molecular processes.

Consequently, the social scientific study of epigenetics emerges as a crucial extension of systems-theoretical thinking, particularly in developing a structural approach to biopolitics and socioeconomic conditions. If, as Foucault argues, biopolitics is a mode of state power over life, the epigenetic approach reveals a deeper interface between biological systems and social-ecological realities. According to Foucault, the right to decide life and death was one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power, as seen in the ancient patria potestas; it granted the head of the Roman family (the father) the right to dispose of the life of his children and slaves. Although this biopolitical right has diminished over time, it remains relevant in cases of external threats, where “the sovereignty’s very existence was in jeopardy: a sort of right of rejoinder.”[12] 

State power imposed on the human body is conditioned by the defense of the sovereign and its own survival, exercising power over life and death when the biological existence of a population is at stake, such as in times of war or pandemics. Beginning in the seventeenth century, power over life evolved in two key directions: on one hand, it became centered on the body as a machine, focusing on its disciplining, increasing its usefulness and docility, and integrating it into systems of economic and efficient controls (an anatomo-politics of the human body).

On the other hand, the body was later understood as imbued with the mechanics of life, serving as the basis for biological processes and subject to a wide range of interventions and regulatory controls, such as those related to reproduction, birth and mortality rates, public health, life expectancy, and longevity (a biopolitics of the population). These disciplines of the body and regulations of populations are essential in organizing power over life, enabling it to be deployed effectively.[13] 

 Foucault’s biopolitical clarification can be further elaborated and advanced through an autopoietic approach to the system-environment paradigm, in which biological processes are embedded within an epigenetic constellation. This approach invests life throughout the systemic reality of life, intersecting with political practices, economic interests, bureaucratic governance, and issues such as immigration and racial segregation. These factors contribute to the hierarchization and stratification within social and cultural contexts. Biopower is deeply intertwined with disciplinary techniques and the development of capitalism in the sphere of economic processes, reflecting the relationship between biological existence and political existence.[14]  

However, biopolitics cannot be fully understood without considering the epigenetic techno-paradigm, which enhances the plasticity of phenotypes in plants and animals in response to internal and external stimuli, such as environmental changes or the climate crisis. The autopoietic approach to epigenetic complexity is not reducible to biopower; rather, it addresses the increasing plasticity of living systems in the face of existential threats, contributing to a new construction of the ecological web of life.

Epigenetically acquired traits can be inherited across generations without altering the genetic code or DNA sequences, prompting a reevaluation of evolutionary theory through the lens of structural drift and co-constitution within the ecological constellation. The term “epigenetics” broadly refers to the study of various chemical modifications of chromatin (e.g., DNA methylation, attachment of chemical moieties to histone proteins, and RNA-dependent processes that influence chromatin structure).

Specifically, DNA methylation is a key epigenetic mark that can be stably inherited over multiple generations through both mitosis and meiosis. As one study notes, “DNA methylation, histone modifications, and small RNAs generated by RNA interference (RNAi) are tightly interconnected epigenetic mechanisms in plant genomes.”[15]

Epigenetic effects in ecology and evolution open a new avenue for bridging science and religion, tempering the significance of biopower in its negative form, while addressing the environmental conditions that influence epigenetic variation. The intersection between epigenetics and biopower reveals how social and environmental factors impact human biology, offering new ways for power mechanisms to regulate populations, particularly in relation to the systemic reality of social stratification.

Social scientific analysis of autopoietic systems, alongside the layers of social and cultural strata exposed to vulnerabilities in power imbalances (such as access to privilege, wealth, education, occupation, and public health), is crucial. The articulation of biopolitics within autopoietic systems in its diverse public spheres remains essential for understanding how modern technological control over life operates at the molecular level, while also accounting for biomedical interventions and the biologically embedded nature of social inequality.

This scientific episteme is vital for a public theology of science, addressing social and cultural justice in a broader context, particularly advocating for disadvantaged populations in the face of structural racism, as well as the commodification of epigenetic data and unjust state interventions.

In fact, Aristotle’s concept of the human being as a social-political animal resonates with the autopoietic horizon of living systems. The body, as the site of perception and meaning, is not merely reducible to the biological, though the biological remains vital and incorporeal in bodies that are simultaneously spiritual or symbolic. For Foucault, there is a “history of bodies” and the manner in which what is most material and vital within them has been invested.”[16]

If Foucault, in his genealogy of bodies, highlights sex as both a unique signifier and a universal signified,[17] I extend this genealogy of political bodies to include embodiment and enaction within the evolutionary history of interaction, framed by a phenomenological emergence of a meaningful world. Discourse, power relations, and the intentionality of meaning are inseparably interconnected, particularly in the context of a public theology approach to epigenetic science and its autopoietic self-referentiality.

Therefore, science and public theology converge, sharing a common ethical responsibility for the integrity and dignity of life. This convergence not only challenges reductionist views but also opens a critical space for science-and-religion dialogue, exposing the problematic regimes where scientific mechanisms and ethical-political considerations intersect.

Novelty and Emergence of Life

The concept of multiplicity is essential for explaining the origin of complex phenotypic variations and biological novelties, especially within nonlinear dynamics where innovation and diversification occur far from equilibrium. In the study of biological life, key concepts such as nonlinearity, instability, and fluctuations are crucial for understanding creativity and the emergence of novel forms.

For example, under far-from-equilibrium conditions, one can observe the emergence of chemical clocks—chemical reactions that exhibit coherent, rhythmic behavior through processes of self-organization. These reactions involve molecular transformations, where all participating molecules change their chemical identity simultaneously and at regular intervals. This dynamic generates a new form of order, marked by a mechanism of “communication” among molecules.

Such molecular communication cannot occur under equilibrium conditions; it arises only in far-from-equilibrium states, which appear to be the norm rather than the exception in the biological world. These phenomena suggest that the emergence of life—and the novelty inherent in its development—is deeply rooted in dynamic, nonlinear processes that transcend mechanistic reductionism.[18]

The ecological systemic position, as conceptualized through the lens of nonlinear thermodynamics, revitalizes the punctuated equilibrium approach by articulating a dialectical relationship between conserved core processes and somatic adaptability. This epistemic framework serves as a heuristic tool for explaining evolutionary adaptation, particularly in terms of how adaptation both shapes and is shaped by conservation.

In conditions of thermodynamic equilibrium, matter is effectively “blind”—unresponsive to environmental variation. However, in far-from-equilibrium states, matter gains the capacity to “perceive” or respond to external differences, integrating them into its patterns of functioning. In this context, the evolvability of life reflects a distinctive mode of responsiveness to the conditions of the biosphere—one inherently structured by the nonlinearities of chemical reactions and sustained by the far-from-equilibrium state imposed by solar radiation.

Thus, life not only arises from but is continuously shaped by this dynamic interplay of energy, structure, and information, all embedded within a systemic ecological framework that transcends linear causality and reductionist paradigms.

In the framework of nonlinear systems operating far from equilibrium, even a small fluctuation can initiate an entirely new evolutionary trajectory, drastically altering the overall behavior of the macroscopic system.[19]

The ecosystem view of the adaptive core process supports a theory of autopoiesis as a conserved core process, emphasizing the structural role of the organism within its ecological context and its entanglement with epigenetic mechanisms. In essence, “somatic adaptability provides for only certain types of facilitated phenotypic variation.”[20]

Embodied Innovation and the Adaptive Core Process

New phenotypes emerge in the evolutionary process not solely through genetic mutations but increasingly through environmental influences mediated by embodiment and enaction. This dynamic underpins the adaptive core process through fluctuations that drive innovation or the emergence of new order in states of nonlinear equilibrium. Facilitated variation, through diverse linkages and metabolic pathways, supports the adaptive core processes in terms of structural perturbation and even rupture, giving rise to bursts of innovation or the emergence of dissipative structures in non-equilibrium conditions.

These multiple realities create favorable conditions for the emergence of phenotypic variation, diversification, and evolutionary novelty—poised at the threshold between structural coherence and enactive engagement with the environment. Through embodied action, an organism brings forth its own world, thereby reinforcing the systems-theoretical position. In this context, contingency does not dominate; rather, it is complexity and fluctuation that shape the organism’s adaptive structures in relation to external conditions through processes of symbiotic co-evolution.

An autopoietic system operates through intricate regulatory linkages, embedded in symbiotic rhythms and catalytic modulations across multiple levels of organization. This implies that information is transmitted within the system via feedback loops—both reversible and irreversible—at the molecular level. Signals from the external environment pass through chains of intracellular communication until a coherent response is enacted. This response, in turn, may reshape the organism itself or modify its environment, highlighting the bidirectional nature of organism-environment interactions.

This social-ecological view of life offers conceptual clarity for understanding autopoiesis and systems-theoretical differentiation. It emphasizes the punctuated dialectic between conserved core processes and facilitated variation, as organisms engage with their natural environments. Such a framework illuminates the embodied dimension of life, particularly in near- or far-from-equilibrium states, where indeterminacy, novelty, and emergence are central to evolutionary creativity.

Ultimately, this biological position—rooted in multiplicity and modulation—supports the integration of autopoietic theory with a broader theory of lifelines. In elaborating the dialectic of punctuated equilibrium, it foregrounds the dynamic tension between cellular conservation and somatic adaptability, upholding the significance of conserved core processes while affirming the irreversibility of time in the unfolding biological interface between organism and environment.

Autopoiesis, Prolepsis, and the Enactive World

Catalytic circulation and feedback mechanisms at the molecular level reinforce the autopoietic view of life in terms of operational closure and self-referential circularity, challenging the limitations of the central dogma of molecular biology and its gene-deterministic assumptions. A comprehensive theory of autopoiesis must extend beyond self-reference alone, fully integrating embodied cognition, enaction, and the epigenetic landscape—all of which play central roles in regulating gene expression, mediating adaptation, and even repairing mutations.

The boundary of the cell, defined by the membrane, encloses the cytoplasm—rich in nutrients and organelles—forming an internal ocean from which the cell continually regenerates its structure. Membranes not only compartmentalize internal structures (such as the nucleus and mitochondria) but also function as dynamic regulatory interfaces, limiting diffusion and preserving the internal network of production that sustains the membrane itself. Energy carriers derived from nutrients are processed within the mitochondria, fueling enzymatic reactions essential for cellular life. This dynamic reveals that cellular self-organization is inseparable from symbiotic processes and the epigenetic world in which the cell is embedded.

In Francisco Varela’s view, autopoietic systems are defined by their autonomy, achieved through operational closure—a condition wherein systemic operations recursively give rise to further systemic operations. At the same time, these systems remain open to the flow of energy and matter from their environment. Autonomy is not isolation, but a form of interdependent self-constitution. Through embodiment and enaction, biological systems interact meaningfully with their environment, generating a world that is not pre-given but brought forth through lived activity. Varela’s perspective thus supports a systemic ecological view of life, grounded in embodied cognition and enactive engagement, offering a more integrative biological theory of lifelines that bridges structure, function, and meaning.[21]

Given this reasoning, we must consider the structural operations of the epigenetic world, which regulate the entire process of cellular autopoiesis through a collective, complex system of catalytic functions. The Santiago theory of cognition identifies living systems as cognitive systems, emphasizing that cognition is not separate from life—it is a process of living. In the continual, active interaction between a system and its environment, perturbations are addressed through the system’s capacity for functional differentiation, enabling it to adapt to external challenges.

Within the autopoietic process of living organisms, structural clues are essential for self-maintenance. These include lipid bilayers—spontaneously assembled by the amphiphilic structure of phospholipids to form cell membranes; enzyme-substrate interactions—where enzymes act as structural catalysts for specific substrates; and the structural properties of DNAand RNA, which govern replication and transcription.

The concept of structural clues belongs to a broader framework of structural coupling or irritation, describing the co-evolutionary interactions between an autopoietic system and its environment. In Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, irritation refers to how an autopoietic system—such as a social subsystem—is perturbed by its environment, prompting internal restructuring as a form of adaptation.

However, when situated within the epigenetic context, irritation implies a more intricate reality. It suggests an interface where histone modifications interact with the socio-ecological constellation, including cultural stratification, economic inequality, and environmental pollution. I refer to this dynamic as a structural interface of irritation, highlighting how environmental stressors—such as toxic exposures or social adversity—induce changes in gene expression through epigenetic mechanisms.

We must not relativize the foundational insight that catalytic function underpins the emergence of novelty. A symbiotic view of life recognizes the irreducible role of the “other”—whether environmental, cellular, or social—within the organism. This perspective is equally vital in the socio-cultural sphere, where differentiation and adaptation occur in tandem.

There exists, moreover, a common structure of the lifeworld, transmitted through history, language, and culture, which shapes human cognition, critical reflection, and prolepticconsciousness—the anticipatory structure underlying life and thought in process. Proleptic cognition is embodied and enacted, anticipating the emergence of new forms of life and meaning.

The concept of prolepsis, traditionally a rhetorical or literary device, represents a future event as though it has already occurred, or anticipates an objection before it arises. At the phenomenological level, however, it describes a proleptic consciousness grounded in lived experience, embedded in the intersubjective world, and capable of drawing the future into vivid presence.

Within time-consciousness, prolepsis parallels pretension—the anticipatory movement that shapes our experience of temporal continuity. Just as a melody is perceived as a continuous whole through the horizon of protention, proleptic consciousness projects possibility into a flowing now. This idea resonates with a kind of kairological time, a lived, unfolding temporality where emergence is sensed before it arrives.

The concept of prolepsis as radioactive further deepens this reflection. In the 2020 film Radioactive, which tells the story of physicist Marie Curie, radioactivity is portrayed not just as a physical phenomenon, but as a disruptive force of anticipation—something that changes the present by revealing the unseen dynamics of the future. In this light, prolepsis becomes radioactive: it illuminates and transforms, foreshadowing emergent realities within both the biological and cultural dimensions of life.

Coda

The autopoietic approach to ecological systems and structural drift facilitates a social systems theory through intentionality, immanent critique, and the project of prolepsis toward emancipation. It challenges what is culturally sedimented and taken for granted—such as prejudice, obscurity, and hierarchical domination—as well as epistemological closures and rigid boundaries. This critique is especially relevant when viewed through the horizon of prolepsis, which opens the possibility of anticipating and transforming future modes of social being, as expressed in the emergence of life within the realm of dissipative structures.

In other words, a structural theory of systemic reality is grounded in the autopoietic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium, emphasizing the dialectical relationship between the deep structure of conserved core processes, facilitated variations, and the conservation of somatic adaptation in self-referential interaction with other systems of reference.

These ideas are rearticulated through evolvability in co-constitution, life’s intentionality, and the horizon of meaning—concepts that are explored through immanent critique within the circularity and emancipation of life’s emergence at a higher level of order within both ecological and socio-cultural systems. In the evolutionary history of organism-environment interactions, when structural configurations failed to enable the organism to conserve organization and adapt for continuity and reproduction, extinction followed.

An autopoietic rupture can occur at the edge of chaos, beyond the structural coupling, where failure to self-organize leads to decline and collapse under the excessive stress of epigenetic constellations, or where innovation gives rise to new emergent systems at a higher order in an unpredictable manner. This refers to the biological interpretation of dissipative structures, which are sensitive to small fluctuations in the conditions of nonlinear equilibrium. Life’s emergent reality, therefore, follows a critical-emancipatory pathway, characterized by structural coupling, irritation, bursts of innovation, and cycles of decline and collapse.

This critical-emancipatory position is essential for advancing a public theology of science, particularly in relation to critical neuroscience, the phenomenology of lifelines, and social epigenetics. By incorporating ecological and epigenetic dimensions, we gain a richer understanding of collective behavior—not as a static outcome, but as a dynamic interplay shaped by environmental, biological, and socio-cultural feedback loops. A public theology of science finds its ethical significance within this integrative view of the ecological web of life, advocating for justice for the common good and a politics of recognition for co-construction. This implies a preferential option for life, affirming the need to resist the impersonal forces that threaten the integrity of our lifeworld.


[1] Lauren Dalton and Robin Young, Fundamentals of Cell Biology, 84.

[2] Ibid., 75-6.

[3] Ibid., 76.

[4] Marc Kirschner and John Gerhart, The Plausibility of Life, 110.

[5] Deichmann, “The social construction of the social epigenome and the larger biological context.” Epigenetics & Chromatin (2020) 13:37.

[6] Luhmann, Systems Theory, 13.

[7] Barbour, Religion and Science, 2nd ed. 286.

[8] Luhmann, Systems Theory, 15.

[9] Ibid., 16.

[10] Ibid., 17.

[11] Nobel, The Music of Life, 18.

[12] Michelle Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol.1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 135.

[13] Ibid., 139.

[14] Ibid., 141-2.

[15] Martin Miryeganeh, and Hidetoshi Saze, “Epigenetic inheritance and plant evolution,” Population Ecology (2019), 1 [1–11]. https://doi.org/10. 1002/1438-390X.12018

[16] Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol.1, 152.

[17] Ibid., 154.

[18] Prigogine and Stengers, Order Out of Chaos, 13.

[19] Ibid., 14.

[20] Ibid., 74.

[21] Varela, “Autopoiese, strukturelle Kopplung und Therapie. Fragen an Francisco Varela.” In Lebende Systeme, ed. F. B. Simon (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 149. [148–64]