Abstract
In the historical and cultural context of Islam, radical Islamism is part of a problematic regime that must be overcome through an enlightened interpretation of Islam. I provide a critical analysis of the genealogy of radical Islamism and its political violence, focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood, and exemplifying this with groups like the Taliban and figures such as Osama bin Laden. At the same time, I present the enlightened side of Islam as an immanent critique of dangerous militant ideologies and their autocratic politics, as demonstrated in the case of the Rushdie affair. Furthermore, I introduce Islam as a symbol of hope, emphasizing its positive contributions to civil society, democracy, and dialogue among civilizations.
Internal Conflict: Political Islam and Secularism
Democratic openings occurred and culminated in the 1919 revolution in Egypt against British occupation (which lasted from November 1918 to July 1919). Ultimately, the United Kingdom recognized Egyptian independence in 1922 and a new Egyptian constitution was implemented in 1923. However, the British government retained significant influence by refusing to recognize full Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan and by maintaining military forces at the Suez Canal.
These problematic relations continued for decades and eventually led to the Egyptian revolution of 1952. Arab socialism emerged in Egypt under the Revolutionary Council headed by General Muhammad Naguib, and was further developed politically by Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) during his presidency.
In the West, the political system based on the sovereignty of the people is underpinned by the separation of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial—intended to provide checks and balances among branches of government. This theory, championed by thinkers such as Montesquieu and John Locke, aims to prevent tyranny and protect individual rights. It forms the foundation of modern constitutional democracy. In this context, there is no such thing as a “Christian state.”
In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser rose to power through the 1952 revolution and served as president from 1956 until his death in 1970. His policy of pan-Arabism was characterized by socialism and nationalism—especially the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956—alongside anti-imperialism, modernization efforts, and social reform. However, his regime was also marked by authoritarianism, suppression of dissent, and the military’s dominance over civilian institutions.
Opposition to his rule came from the Muslim Brotherhood, which had spread across the Middle East. Founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), a disciple of Rashid Rida, the Brotherhood emerged four years after the abolition of the caliphate by the Ottoman Empire. Known as proponents of political Islam or Islamism, the Brotherhood based their ideology on the Qur’an and the Sunna. They also promoted a form of social Islamism that sought to re-Islamize Egypt through mass education, as well as social and economic reform. In its initial stages, the Muslim Brotherhood was committed to non-violence and legal methods, working within the existing legal framework. They also stood in opposition to extremist Zionist groups.[1]
However, a more radical form of political Islam was developed by Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) within the Muslim Brotherhood, which has come to be associated with modern Islamic extremism or militant Islam. The assassination of the Egyptian prime minister in 1948 led to a wave of arrests and imprisonments, resulting in the eventual banning of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Qutb became a point of contention within the Brotherhood, with some advocating for a more confrontational approach, while others favored a moderate, gradual approach through non-violence. After spending nine years in prison, he denounced the Egyptian regime as un-Islamic and was eventually executed in 1966 for allegedly plotting to assassinate Nasser.
In 1981, President Anwar as-Sadat was assassinated by militant members of the Muslim Brotherhood during a military parade in Cairo. After Sadat’s death, the Egyptian state, particularly under Hosni Mubarak (president from 1981), and later under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, used radical interpretations of Qutb’s writings to justify the suppression of the Brotherhood.
However, the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood collaborated with the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak in opposition to Arab socialism and the authoritarianism of Nasser’s politics. Despite their ideological differences, they stood for democracy and pluralism, playing a significant role in Egyptian civil society and politics.[2]
Political Islam, founded upon the initial Islamization, filled the void of depoliticization created by Nasserism, which violently suppressed both the moderately liberal democratic opposition and the communist popular movement. The application of Sharia law remained central in the earlier conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime, as Sharia itself is indifferent to both democracy and autocratic forms of power.[3]
Militant Islam differs from traditional Islam in several key ways, primarily by transforming faith into a radical political ideology. Its roots trace back to Egypt in the 1920s, particularly through the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the influence of Sayyid Qutb on Salafi jihadism. This ideology later manifested in groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS, both of which embody a Salafi-jihadist vision for a global caliphate.
Abdelwahab Meddeb, the Tunisian Muslim scholar at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, provided a diagnosis of intégrisme as “the sickness of Islam,” much like intolerance has been called the sickness of Catholicism. The term integralism refers to the preservation of faith in its “integer” form, with an unaltered interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna. This is closely tied to anti-Western resentment. Integralism is evident in the works of 20th-century political Islamists such as Rashid Rida, Hasan al-Banna, Abu A’la al-Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb.[4]
In the 1920s, secularism was imposed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, and a single-party system (the Republican People’s Party) was established in 1924. Although inspired by the French Enlightenment model, the historical experience of secularism in Turkey differs significantly from the European or American experience of secularization. The hoped-for combination of religious freedom and political democracy was not fully realized in Turkey. As a NATO member, Turkey continues to grapple with tensions between its secular Kemalist principles and the rise of militant Islam, navigating a complex relationship between the two.[5]
Taliban and Osama bin Laden
Islamism, or militant Islam, has three main features:
- A commitment to the sacred law, striving to live fully in accordance with Sharia, which touches every aspect of life, in contrast to modern secular practices.
- A rejection of Western influences, including customs, philosophy, political institutions, and moral-cultural values.
- A transformation of faith into allegiance to a political ideology, aiming for global Islamization.
Islamism, as an Islamic form of totalitarianism, emerged in the historical context of the decline of fascism and Marxism-Leninism. The Islamic Republic of Iran, established in 1979, became the banner bearer of militant Islam, promoting its ideology throughout the Muslim world. In early 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini wrote to Mikhail Gorbachev, offering his own government as a model.
“I openly announce that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the greatest and most powerful base of the Islamic world, can easily help fill up the ideological vacuum of your system.”[6]
Throughout the 1980s, Afghans mounted a formidable resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which was widely viewed in the Muslim world as a legitimate form of jihad. Many of the resistance leaders drew inspiration from Islamist ideologues such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu’l Ala Maududi. They were joined by Muslims and others from around the world, including Osama bin Laden from Saudi Arabia and Ayman al-Zawahiri from Egypt, both of whom played pivotal roles in the conflict. The resistance was also heavily supported by U.S. weapons, training, and financing.
In 1994, the Taliban (“students”), a Pashtun nationalist movement, rose to power in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent instability of the early 1990s. The Taliban ruled Afghanistan during their first reign (1996–2001). A New York Times report from November 13, 2001, captured the sentiment of liberation from the regime’s repressive cruelty, as seen in a town in Afghanistan.
“In the twelve hours since the Taliban soldiers left this town, a joyous mood has spread. The people of Taliqan, who lived for two years under the Taliban’s oppressive Islamic rule, burst onto the streets to toss off the restrictions that had burrowed into the most intimate aspects of their lives. Men tossed their turbans into the gutters. Families dug up their long-hidden television sets. Restaurants blared music.”[7]
While the Taliban’s ideology was influenced by Qutb’s call for a return to the original vision of Islam, they also offered refuge to Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi exile. In their nostalgic quest for the original vision of Islam, women are veiled and forbidden from participating in professional life. Only religious broadcasting is permitted, and harsh Islamic punishments such as stoning and mutilation have been reintroduced.
Most members of the Taliban belong to the Pashtun tribe, and they tend to target non-Pashtuns. This ethnic chauvinism has little basis in the teachings of the Prophet. Their brutal treatment of minority groups also contradicts clear Quranic principles. The Taliban’s discrimination against women is especially egregious, as it is in direct opposition to the practice of the Prophet and the conduct of the early ummah (community of Muslims).[8]
In 1989, after years of resistance, Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, and two years later, the USSR collapsed. Following the Soviet departure, many foreign volunteers returned to their home countries. Osama bin Laden was one of the most notable figures to do so. However, the Saudi regime soon turned against him, revoking his citizenship.
Bin Laden then established al-Qaeda (“The Base”)—a platform designed to carry out a wide range of jihadist struggles. Over time, al-Qaeda shifted its focus to a specific set of enemies, identifying the United States and Jews as the primary culprits behind global problems. This led to the formation of the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (Western Christians) in 1998.
Al-Qaeda carried out a number of high-profile attacks worldwide, with the most notorious being the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The 9/11 attacks, along with subsequent acts of terrorism by Muslim extremists, epitomized al-Qaeda’s commitment to a global jihad, which was closely aligned with the Taliban leadership at the time.
Half of al-Qaeda’s operations were based in Afghanistan, while tens of thousands of its militants—many of whom were well-educated and middle-class—settled in various foreign countries. These militants formed cells that have spread across the globe, creating a widespread network.[9]
On February 23, 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwa in the name of the World Islamic Front for Jihad, declaring it the duty of every Muslim to fight and kill Americans. This fatwa contributed to a rise in Islamophobia and hate crimes, particularly following bin Laden’s death.
“Critical questions continue to be raised about the relationship between Islam and pressing issues such as religious extremism, violence, terrorism, and suicide bombing. On the other hand, there are also broader concerns surrounding modernization, democracy, human rights, and gender equality. One central question remains whether Sharia can effectively preserve fundamental human rights in today’s world.
The Rushdie Affair
In 1988, Indian-British author Salman Rushdie published The Satanic Verses, a novel that parodied the life of Prophet Muhammad and his family in ways that many found deeply insulting. The title of the novel refers to verses 19 to 23 of Surah 53 in the Qur’an, which, in their original context, mentioned three pre-Islamic deities as daughters of Allah. These verses, considered by some to be false revelations, came to be known as the ‘satanic verses.’[10]
The Satanic Verses, which focuses on a group of Qur’anic verses about three pre-Islamic pagan goddesses—Al-Lat, Al-Uzza, and Manat—became controversial for its portrayal of Prophet Muhammad initially proclaiming false revelations about these deities.
However, according to Muhammad Asad’s explanation, the Qur’an, through these verses, highlights the blasphemous imagery held by the Prophet’s pagan contemporaries, epitomized in the triad of Al-Lat, Al-Uzza, and Manat. These goddesses were viewed by the pagan Arabs as “God’s daughters,” placed alongside the angels (whom they also conceived as female) and were worshipped throughout much of pre-Islamic Arabia. Shrines dedicated to these deities existed in both the Hijaz and Najd regions. The worship of Al-Lat, in particular, was ancient, likely of South Arabian origin, and she may have been the prototype for the Greek semi-goddess Leto—who was the wife of Zeus and the mother of Artemis.[11]
At any rate, the book cast doubt on the authenticity of the Messenger’s divine revelations and won the 1988 Whitbread Award for Novel of the Year. However, its perceived blasphemy sparked violent protests, bombings, killings, and riots.
In 1989, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa against Rushdie, which led to multiple failed assassination attempts on the author. When Khomeini issued his fatwa on February 14, 1989, it was declared un-Islamic by the ulama of al-Azhar and Saudi Arabia. In Iran itself, 127 intellectuals signed a protest against Khomeini’s edict. The fatwa was also condemned by forty-eight out of the forty-nine member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).[12]
Even as late as August 2022, assassination attempts continued, despite The Satanic Verses being hailed as a literary masterpiece in both the United Kingdom and the United States. The event became a flashpoint, with many in the Islamic world seeing it as further evidence of the West’s disregard for Islam.
Meanwhile, some American evangelists seized the opportunity to fuel anti-Islamic rhetoric. For instance, the Reverend Franklin Graham called Islam “a very evil and wicked religion” in a broadcast shortly after the September 11 attacks.
On 60 Minutes, the Reverend Jerry Falwell described Prophet Muhammad as “a violent man, a man of war,” concluding, “I think Muhammad was a terrorist.” Although Falwell issued an apology within two weeks, the damage to interfaith relations was already done.[13]
Protestant evangelism and Islamic extremism both significantly undermine and distort the concept of God as al-Rahman (the Merciful), one of the most frequently invoked attributes of God in Islam. This attribute is emphasized in Surah 55 of the Qur’an, where al-Rahman is highlighted as a defining quality of God. Similarly, Surah Al-Fatihah, the opening chapter of the Qur’an, begins by invoking God as “the Merciful and Compassionate,” underscoring His foundational role as a source of mercy and compassion.
Divine mercy, paired with divine forgiveness, is a central theme in Islam, emphasizing the cultural values of the common good and social justice (zakat, the mandatory tax for the poor). This vision extends to non-Muslims, reflecting an Islamic norm aimed at benefiting all of humanity.
The Qur’anic verses from the Meccan period emphasize freedom of faith and the equal dignity of all human beings, regardless of religion or gender. In contrast, verses from the Medina period impose certain restrictions on the rights of women and non-Muslims. Traditionally, the Meccan verses have been abrogated or replaced by the later Medina verses. However, there is a growing call to reverse this process of abrogation in order to develop a modern version of sharia that affirms the equal rights of women and non-Muslims.
The historical formulations of sharia often contain elements of discrimination, which need to be critically reevaluated. To achieve this, the sunna (traditions) and other sources of sharia should be interpreted through a hermeneutical approach—reassessing the valid messages from the Meccan verses, while also accounting for the time-conditioned context of the Medina verses. This would address the historical legal distortions introduced by traditional religious scholars.[14]
The Qur’an’s sympathy with human frailty (e.g., 70:20–22; 89:16–21) reshapes the concept of sharia in terms of mercy, forgiveness, and the rectification of wrongdoing. This stands in stark contrast to the biopolitical discipline and control associated with sharia legalism, which often emphasizes retaliation and harsh punishment.
Islam and the Image of Hope
In his masterpiece on Islam, Hans Küng characterizes Islam as an image of hope. He cites the Muslim scholar Malek Chebel, who further elaborates on this vision: “One must recall the hope of millions of Muslims who reject a radical Islam (many are even fighting against it at risk of their lives) and who attach importance to rediscovering a positive Islam, that of Averroes, of critical thought or of the nineteenth-century “Renaissance” (nahdah), in a word an Islam of the Enlightenment, an enlightened Islam.”[15]
There is a positive, constructive side to Islam, one that looks forward with hope and purpose. “God does not change the condition of a people until they change what is within themselves.” (13:11)
This Quranic message serves as an undercurrent in Islamic public theology, striving to combine faith with rational thinking. In other words, it represents a hermeneutical mediation between traditional texts and the reader’s modern critical consciousness, aiming for the fusion of different horizons to address public issues.
This process can be understood as an epistemological procedure: appreciating the tradition, maintaining a critical distance from or problematizing what is obscure or sedimented, providing adumbration, and ultimately engaging in semantic retrieval for solidarity and emancipation. Homo lector is, indeed, homo socius and ethicus.
As Muslim countries continue to struggle with developing effective governance consistent with Islamic principles, some contemporary thinkers have expanded the list of essential rights to include consultation – the right to participatory government. Some even classify consultation as a duty rather than a right.
However, regardless of whether it is viewed as a right or duty, the issue is rooted in the Quran’s emphasis on consultative governance, or shura. In a chapter by that name (Sura 42), the Quran explicitly requires that people conduct their affairs through mutual consultation. The Quran also instructs Prophet Muhammad himself to consult with his followers on practical matters (3:159).
Democracy and Dialogue among Civilizations
European Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan emphasizes the importance of this theme. Any government that adheres to Islamic principles must ensure communal consultation, involving both men and women, through direct elections or representative bodies. The most effective means of achieving this is through a consultative council made up of elected members. These representatives should be chosen based on competence in areas relevant to daily life, rather than heredity or any other unearned criterion. This competence enables them to exercise ijtihad in a collective sense, allowing them to deliberate and formulate ways to implement Islamic principles in contemporary society.[16]
In 1998, the UN General Assembly called for the promotion of dialogue among civilizations in response to the Cassandra-like crises predicting a clash of civilizations. The year 2001 was subsequently proclaimed as the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. In his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 21, 1998, Iran’s President Seyed Mohammad Khatami emphasized the importance of this initiative: “In the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran I would like to propose that the United Nations, as a first step, designates the year 2001 as the “Year of Dialogue among Civilizations,” in the earnest hope that through such a dialogue the realization of universal justice and liberty may be initiated.”[17]
According to Khatami, modernity is not a godless rejection of religion; rather, it is a rejection of “autocratic and whimsical rulers” who plagued the pre-modern West and continue to affect the Muslim world. Modernity calls for freedom of thought and expression to break free from the shackles of these autocrats, who base their legitimacy on traditional interpretation[18]
The discussion of rights includes freedom of conscience and expression, grounded in the Qur’an’s prohibition of compulsion in matters of religion (2:256). Muslims and non-Muslims should coexist under the equal protection of the law. This necessitates a framework that supports democratic pluralism, grounded in the Islamic system of consultation and independent reasoning.
In a similar vein, Raman argues, “To say that all philosophy must of necessity contradict theology or its suppositions is to play not only a naïve game but a dangerous one. I can say without fear of contradiction that, for the Qur’an, knowledge-that is, the creation of ideas-is an activity of the highest possible value.”[19]
[1] Eugene Rogan, The Arabs, a History (New York: Penguin, 2010), 248-50.
[2] Kűng, Islam, 446.
[3] Amin, Eurocentrism, 73.
[4] Küng, Islam, 392.
[5] Ramadan, Islam and the Arab Awakening, 76.
[6] Cited in Daniel Pipes, Militant Islam Reaches America (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 9.
[7] Cited in ibid., 249.
[8] Armstrong, Islam, 170.
[9] Pipes, Militant Islam Reaches America, 146.
[10] Jamal J. Elias, Islam, 94.
[11] The Message of the Quran, 1105.
[12] Armstrong, Islam, 175.
[13] Sonn, Islam, 186-7.
[14] Kűng, Islam, 574.
[15] Ibid., 647.
[16] Tariq Ramadan, “The Notion of Shura: Shura or Democracy?” <http://www.tariq=ramadan.org/document.asp?id=10&fichier=Shura.9/28/03>.
[17] Cited in Kung, Islam, 654.
[18] Sonn, Islam, 172.
[19] Rahman, Islam & Modernity, 158.