Overcoming social inequalities
Traugott Jähnichen
Introduction: On understanding public theology and the significance of social ethics
Public theology is a theological program developed in various contexts, which understands the public sphere of civil society as a cultural space for communication about moral and truth claims, as well as the understanding of history. This space is neither identical with state power nor with the self-understanding of religious communities, although both can influence it. In the public sphere, cultural, political, and social issues are negotiated from an ethical perspective in a unique way. Religious communities – especially churches – also contribute their voices to this discourse. In the German context, Wolfgang Huber has programmatically described public theology as encompassing “the critical reflection on the activities and effects of Christianity within the public sphere, as well as dialogical participation in reflecting on the identity and crises, the goals and tasks of society” (Huber 1999, 117). This therefore involves a twofold task: empirically and descriptively, it is necessary to ask about the significance of Christianity in the public sphere, and normatively and prescriptively, it is necessary to introduce theologically grounded objectives into the social discourse.
It is the specific task of Protestant social ethics, as a subfield of public theology, to perceive social, economic and technical, and political developments in society, to evaluate them from a theological perspective, and to provide impetus for reform in social life through its own pronouncements in the sense of an ethics of comparison. In this sense, the aim is to convey, from the perspective of the Christian faith, impulses for a shaping of social orders that is more oriented towards the common good. Thus, in line with the Barmen Declaration of the Confessing Church, a fundamental understanding of the perception of public responsibility has become established, which, in accordance with the second thesis of the Barmen Declaration, rejects the notion of “inherent laws” of certain areas of life over which the church cannot exert influence. Instead, it emphasizes “God’s powerful claim on our whole life” (Barmen Declaration 1984, 35), from which the church’s shared responsibility for all areas of life arises.
In fulfilling this responsibility, it is essential to consider the diversity of societal spheres. Therefore, an interdisciplinary academic orientation and a dialogical openness in the search for normative orientations are necessary (cf. Bedford-Strohm 2019, 15 f; Kim/Day 2017). Ethical impulses in modern, pluralistic societies cannot be developed from a single perspective alone, but only in dialogue with other communities and stakeholders. In this respect, the task of public theology is complex: Theology must express its normative impulses, rooted in biblical tradition, in a generally understandable form. Heinrich Bedford-Strohm states that public theology must be “bilingual” (Bedford-Strohm 2019, 15), meaning it must express itself theologically concisely while simultaneously arguing within the framework of universal rationality. Furthermore, the specific logic of a social system must be considered in order to translate ethical impulses into maxims for action that can be processed by that system; that is, it involves a differentiated perception of and influence on, for example, the economic or political order. Taking up and expanding the idea of “bilingualism”, one can speak of a polyglot public theology, since this must make itself understood to its respective counterparts in society – corresponding to how functionally differentiated societies operate.
This article examines current economic developments from the perspective of conceptions of justice (cf. Kim/Day 2017, Chapter 3). Accordingly, it first explores a biblically grounded understanding of social justice from a theological perspective, which will then be introduced into general debates on justice. The concept of participatory justice will be presented as a guiding principle. Secondly, the article considers the problem of growing inequality in almost all industrialized societies, in order to then offer solutions from the perspective of participatory justice as a socio-ethical contribution to public theology.
I. The theological understanding of justice in the context of current debates on justice
I.1. The biblical perspective of justice as solidarity
The Old Testament concept of justice focuses essentially on the “community-like” (Thiel 2003, 19) nature of actions, in the sense of successful reciprocity in social interactions. Underlying this concept is a way of life shaped by concrete communal relationships within the framework of family, clan, or nation, whereby just behavior essentially means fulfilling the respective communal demands. It is about ensuring actions that promote the well-being of the community.[1] This fundamental intention is reflected in the observation that the corresponding Hebrew term “tzedakah” is less oriented towards an abstract legal norm and more towards relationships: relationships with God, with family and clan, with one’s own people, and beyond that, with other people in one’s environment. Since human benevolence is essentially grounded in the capacity for relationships, justice means behavior appropriate to the respective relationship; in modern terms, one could speak of obligations of solidarity. This brings personal and communal relationships into focus, which is why “tzedakah” is appropriately translated for the present day as “solidarity”, which is basically “understood as loyalty to one’s own community” (Höffe 2007, 169).
The concept of solidarity referred to here was described by Emil Durkheim with the term “organic solidarity” (Durkheim 1981, 84). Originally, “solidarity” was a legal term and denoted a community of shared responsibility. During the 19th century, “solidarity” was adopted as a guiding principle by the socialist labor movement as well as within the framework of Christian social teaching. The term is to be understood both descriptively and normatively: Solidarity can be defined as “the fact of human connection and shared destiny” (Council of the EKD/DBK 1997, 47), which simultaneously implies the normative expectation that people bound by solidarity “pursue common interests and refrain from self-serving pursuits of advantage when these are at the expense of others or the community” (ibid.). Solidarity thus describes, on the basis of shared connectedness, the development of an ethos that, however, must not be limited to “solidarity among friends” (ibid.), but ultimately has to shape the relationship between all social groups.
Solidarity, in this sense, is essentially determined by the idea of reciprocity, as it is based on a shared “we” identity that guarantees mutual loyalty and, in times of need, reliable assistance. Solidarity can thus be understood as the ethos of social groups based on similar life circumstances. This sense of community, characterized by a strong feeling of belonging, mutual obligations, a shared sense of purpose, and corresponding expectations of reciprocal action—or, in contemporary usage, “solidarity”—describes the crucial aspects of the Old Testament concept of justice (cf. Jähnichen 2007).
According to biblical understanding, justice as solidarity creates a sphere that can be described as a healing field of reliable social interactions for both the initiator and the other members of the community. Ideally, this leads to a “reciprocity of acting for one another” (Huber 1998, 159), which can establish and guarantee stable relationships of solidarity over extended periods. According to biblical understanding, the solidarity that enables a healthy social life is guaranteed by God, who in turn administers justice in the sense of communal faithfulness to his people and thus makes solidarity within the people possible. In particular, this means guaranteeing fair justice through impartial judges (cf. Deut. 16:19-20). Equally fundamental to securing justice as solidarity is the action of the king, who, according to Psalm 72, is to demonstrate “exemplary social commitment to the helpless, the oppressed, and the disadvantaged” (Thiel 2003, 22) in order to ensure the community’s loyalty. The associated expectations form a normative standard for evaluating royal actions and ultimately aim at the coming of an ideal future ruler, as expressed in messianic prophecies (e.g., Isaiah 11). The perspective of protecting the poor, the weak, and the disadvantaged plays a crucial role here, increasingly becoming the benchmark for just action in the biblical context. The commitment to the weakest is grounded in mutual obligations of solidarity and is further developed in an exemplary manner in the social legislation of Deuteronomy and in the restitution provisions of the Holiness Code (cf. Lev. 25), so that the poor and weak are granted a divinely guaranteed and institutionally secured legal claim to support and help.
Profound breaches of the ethos of solidarity were sharply condemned, especially by the prophets, who particularly denounced the undermining of the legal order through both illegal and illegitimate actions (cf., for example, Amos 2:6-8). They responded to the abandonment of obligations of solidarity with the announcement of impending judgment, with later prophecies increasingly shaped by the hope for a new, divinely ordained communal fidelity. This announcement of a new, saving justice from God, which helps the helpless and oppressed and restores justice, forms, in conjunction with the messianic expectations of an ideal future ruler, a crucial link between Old Testament conceptions of justice and the New Testament.
The salvation of humanity from the disruption of its relationship with God and with its fellow human beings, and thus from falling into the power of sin, has been described, particularly in Pauline theology, through the concept of God’s righteousness, as it was revealed anew in Jesus Christ. Here, the term does not primarily denote an attribute of God, but rather his gift to humanity: “His saving action in his creation,” in which his “faithfulness to his creatures, which endures and is sustained despite all human unfaithfulness” (Huber, 163), is manifested, is constitutive of God’s relationship to humankind. This gift of God, as it is theologically developed in the doctrine of justification, has the ethical consequence of a life and action by believers that corresponds to God’s righteousness. From God’s unconditional solidarity there necessarily follows a “life practice of the group of disciples” oriented toward the “standard of comprehensive righteousness” (Balz 2003, 49).
The consequences of divine justice as the capacity for human solidarity are developed with varying emphases in the Gospels and the Pauline writings, with particular emphasis on the obligations of solidarity toward the weakest members of society (cf. Matthew 25:31 ff, Luke 6:27 f). From a New Testament perspective, justice has been realized by God in Christ to enable believers to live accordingly. Such a life lived according to God’s justice is not to be played off against the concerns and demands of the Torah, but can be substantially oriented toward them (cf. Romans 8:4, Galatians 5:23, etc.). The justice to be practiced is not “solely a matter for individuals… but is to be lived in communities that, in this way, as a paradigm of God’s justice in this time and world—despite all weaknesses and setbacks—already mark the path by which the biblical God intends to achieve the goal he willed for his creation” (Balz 2003, 60). The biblical impulses for an understanding of justice thus aim at the fundamental motif of “justice as solidarity.”
I.2. Participatory justice as a theological impulse for the further development of the concept of justice as fairness
This biblical impulse has been incorporated into recent theological and social-ethical approaches and developed into a concept of “participatory justice” (cf. Bedford-Strohm 1993; EKD 2006) in dialogue with current theories of justice. From a theological perspective, the limitations of a purely neoliberal concept of justice are fundamentally problematic, as it is oriented solely towards parameters of the exchange of services (cf. von Hayek 1981, 62, 153). If the concept of “justice” is associated solely with exchange relationships in the sense of commutative justice (iustitia commutativa) and social justice is rejected, this contradicts the theological understanding of humanity as mutual support and the special assistance of the disadvantaged. Furthermore, the neoliberal concept largely neglects questions concerning the different starting points of the actors and the treatment of marginalized groups in society.
John Rawls developed a far more sophisticated and theologically compatible conception of justice in his model of “justice as fairness.” According to Rawls, the difficulty with normative conceptions in pluralistic societies lies in the fact that no metaphysical understanding of justice, nor one based on particular traditions, can be advocated as a universal guiding principle, since it must be accepted in principle by all members of society. In contrast to comprehensive conceptions, such as those typical of religious, moral, or metaphysical frameworks, because these always attempt to answer the question of truth, a political conception of justice oriented toward rationality is therefore appropriate for modern societies, one which, according to Rawls, can claim universal validity. Accordingly, his conception of justice focuses on the social coexistence of citizens without addressing the question of the truth of a supreme good. The common good of a just society, in which people with differing conceptions of truth live together, is grounded in the freedom and equality of its citizens and must be regulated politically.
In response to the question of fair conditions for freedom and equality in society, Rawls answered with his famous principles of justice: “Each person is equally entitled to a fully adequate system of equal basic rights and liberties, compatible with the same system for all, and within that system the fair value of equal political liberties is guaranteed.” A free society necessarily leads to social and economic inequalities, which are ethically justifiable if they meet the following two conditions: “First, they must be connected with offices and positions open to all on conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must have an effect to the greatest possible benefit for the least favored members of society” (Rawls 1998, 69 f).
Underlying this conception is the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens who, by virtue of reason – and assuming a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1998, 93) as their attitude towards the concrete conditions of their own lives – accept these principles of fairness. Social institutions are rationally founded when “free and equal moral persons under fair conditions” (Rawls 1998, 382) can agree to them in order to create or stabilize a well-ordered society for the benefit of all, in which they can adequately pursue their own interests. The guarantee of political freedoms, in accordance with the first principle of justice, establishes equal political rights, thereby guaranteeing the rule of law and the granting of freedom of thought, conscience, and individual expression. In conjunction with the second principle of justice, the creation of equal opportunities and the linking of social inequalities to the improvement of the living conditions of the least advantaged are intended to ensure that these fundamental freedoms do not remain purely formal. In this sense, Rawls formulates as an important pillar for a sustainable democratic order the maxim that “all citizens … must be guaranteed a fair share of material goods so that they are sufficiently independent and can use their equal fundamental rights, freedoms and opportunities to their own advantage” (Rawls 1992, 321).
Several challenges remain unresolved in the socio-ethical view of justice as fairness. Beyond a fair share of goods, it is equally important for disadvantaged people whether and to what extent they can rely on a dependable social infrastructure. By focusing on people’s actual behavior and their ability to realize the opportunities afforded to them, Amartia Sen brings into focus inequalities in personal characteristics (e.g., illnesses), differences in the geographical or social environment, as well as differing societal standards (the public treatment of poverty, shaming, etc.). Since true poverty essentially means a lack of opportunity, Sen uses the example of people with disabilities to demonstrate that they often face significant difficulties in making adequate use of available resources. Accordingly, it is insufficient to focus primarily—as Rawls did—on basic goods; rather, the focus must be on the prospects for disadvantaged people. Sen demonstrates in his reflections that not only resource transfers, but also the social structures provided, can often contribute at least as much to the self-determined lives of those affected (cf. Sen 2010, 259 ff).
Another question Sen raises regarding Rawls’ concept addresses the issue of what it means when a small or even the tiniest gain for the most disadvantaged group is linked to enormous losses for other groups who are not the worst off, but still very disadvantaged (cf. Sen 2010, 131, 227). From this perspective, it is important not only to focus on the segment of the most disadvantaged group, but also to analyze the effects of political and economic developments on a broader spectrum of people suffering from poverty. This calls into question the clarity of the action options in Rawls’ model, since, according to Sen, a broader analysis reveals several alternatives “all of which remain selectable at the end of the exercise in fairness” (Sen 2010, 229).
Finally, Rawls’ concept remains underdetermined with regard to the ever-deepening social inequalities, which, while potentially providing relative advantages to the least advantaged, lead to an ever-increasing social divide. While Rawls certainly incorporated the idea of compensation, emphasizing that “the least advantaged members… would be even less able to achieve their goals if it were not for the inequalities that satisfy the difference principle” (Rawls Fairness, 233). Furthermore, he addressed the problem of the manipulation of public debate by highly privileged members of society and advocated for a broader distribution of property, not least to enable fair public debate (cf. Rawls 1998, 196-203). However, these considerations remain somewhat vague, so Bedford-Strohm went further by demanding that, given the “overpowering political influence of the most privileged,” the additional condition must be that inequalities “must remain within a framework that ensures the fair value of freedom” (cf. Bedford-Strohm 1993, 290f). In this sense, Bedford-Strohm argues for securing a certain degree of social equality that “prevents freedom from degenerating into an instrument of power for the economically stronger” (Bedford-Strohm 1993, 310). The difficult question of how this condition mentioned by Bedford-Strohm can be operationalized has so far been insufficiently addressed and answered.
To address the considerations for expanding and refining Rawls’ model of justice, as exemplified by Sen and Bedford-Strohm, Protestant social ethics—particularly in Germany—has developed the concept of participatory justice. This normative model attempts to incorporate the biblical impulses of justice as solidarity so that they can bear fruit in dialogue with current discourses on justice. In this sense, the 2006 memorandum of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) on “Just Participation” pointedly described poverty as “lack of participation” (EKD 2006, No. 61) and accordingly placed participatory justice at the center of its understanding of justice. All other forms of justice, in addition to commutative justice, especially capability justice and distributive justice, derive their concrete form and allocation from participatory justice. Capability justice, in particular, aims to improve people’s opportunities to lead free and self-determined lives. In addition to the development of individual potential through socialization, societal resources – especially a sound social infrastructure – are also essential. Enabling justice is therefore closely linked to merit-based justice and equality of opportunity. Distributive justice refers to the fair distribution of goods and resources within society. It aims, in particular, at adequately addressing people’s needs. The central importance of participatory justice means that “enabling justice and distributive justice must not be played off against each other, but rather are mutually dependent” (ibid.). By including the perspectives of disadvantaged people, the various perspectives on justice are balanced in relation to one another in order to establish a more just social order. Since participatory justice encompasses all aspects and resources necessary for a dignified and self-determined life, it represents the core of social justice.
Participatory justice encompasses, not least, the perspective of participation in decision-making processes concerning fundamental questions of social coexistence. According to Rainer Forst, participatory justice in a comprehensive sense asks “which goods should legitimately be distributed to whom, and for what reasons, and even more importantly, who determines the conditions of social production and distribution” (Forst 2015, 51). Going beyond procedural justice, this opens up the perspective that people with experiences of poverty, disadvantage, and marginalization should themselves participate in the development and decision-making regarding the criteria that determine the distribution of resources and thus life chances in society. This must also include the responsibility of current generations for future generations, which, since the Brundtland Commission’s definition, has shaped today’s understanding of “sustainable development.” Here, the question arises as to how participatory justice, particularly with regard to political processes, can be guaranteed for generations not yet born. This problem remains unresolved.
This conception of participatory justice understands itself as an update of the biblical impulse to configure justice essentially from the perspective of solidarity. In this context, solidarity denotes the everyday basis of conceptions of justice. It marks the key socio-ethical concept insofar as solidarity occupies “a normative intermediate position between justice that is no longer owed and voluntary love of humankind” (Höffe 2007, 91). Based on a shared bond, solidarity calls for mutual assistance, which, particularly where the stronger stand up for the weaker, aims at further developing and refining the respective rules of justice.
This dynamic is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition: Rules of reciprocity, as expressed in the “Golden Rule” (cf. Mt 7:12; Lk 6:31), are given a new perspective through reference to the comprehensive commandment of love of neighbor. Paul Ricoeur has concretized this dynamic by examining the relationship between the logic of reciprocity in the “Golden Rule” and the logic of unconditional love for others, as expressed in the commandment of love of neighbor—and radicalized in the commandment of love of enemies. Based on the observation that the “Golden Rule” and the commandment of love of enemies are addressed in close connection and proximity in both Luke and Matthew, Ricoeur emphasizes that the commandment of love of enemies does not negate the “Golden Rule,” but rather reinterprets it in the sense of generosity (cf. Ricoeur 1990, 55). From this perspective, the logic of the non-reciprocity of love is fundamental to understanding the “Golden Rule,” since “without the corrective of the commandment to love… it would constantly be interpreted in a utilitarian sense, the shorthand of which, ‘do ut des,’ would mean ‘I give so that you give'” (Ricoeur 1990, 59). The commandment to love, especially in its intensified form of loving one’s enemies, decisively corrects the possibility of a utilitarian misinterpretation of the “Golden Rule,” as it can manifest itself in economic calculations that “aim only to increase the average benefits for the majority and, for this purpose, marginalize and push to the sidelines a minority” (Ricoeur 1990, 63). In contrast, interpreting the “Golden Rule” in terms of generosity means gradually integrating additional degrees of solidarity and kindness into the rules of justice in society. Therefore, the development of concepts and criteria of justice is an endless process that always requires the remembrance of the tradition of solidarity, of togetherness, and of the impetus for mutual care based on the commandment of love for one’s neighbor.
Theologically, this orientation is not to be understood as a commandment. It stems from the experience of the divine logic of abundance, as it is bestowed upon humanity in the fullness of creation’s gifts and in the experience of God’s communal faithfulness. Based on such experiences, the commandment of love for one’s neighbor could be paraphrased as the imperative: “Give, because it has been given to you” (Ricoeur 1990, 59). It is this biblical view of reality that, from a Christian perspective, opens up a comprehensive solidarity with one another. In this sense, theological and socio-ethical conceptions of justice, such as the participatory justice outlined here, are an attempt to provide impetus for good rules of coexistence in dialogue with other conceptions of justice. These must be continually re-examined in light of societal and especially economic developments, particularly when these developments contradict theological and socio-ethical impulses, as has been the case in recent decades.
II. Instruments for limiting the intensification of social inequalities
II.1. Reasons for the increase in social inequality
Over the past four decades, social inequalities have become intensified significantly in most industrialized nations – and, with few exceptions, this trend is generally true on a global scale. The developments in Germany serve as a prime example: although the increase in income inequality there is comparatively moderate, current inequality figures represent a record high for the Gini coefficient at 0.31.[2] Without social welfare redistribution mechanisms, income inequality in Germany would be even higher. This redistribution is achieved primarily through various transfer payments to lower-income households, while higher-income households bear a greater tax burden. Despite this inequality-reducing effect[3], a considerable degree of inequality in the distribution of household income remains even after redistribution, and this inequality has recently increased further.
Wealth inequality is considerably more pronounced, with Gini coefficients ranging from 0.73 to 0.81, depending on the data source. This places Germany among the countries with the highest wealth concentration in the EU’s Eurozone.[4] Nearly half of the wealth in Germany is not earned but inherited – and is taxed little or not at all. Those who receive large inheritances and gifts were often already wealthy. In this way, wealth is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of a relatively small segment of the population.
Since “social inequalities” are often linked to health limitations, educational disadvantages, inadequate housing, precarious employment, and other factors affecting the less well-off members of society, this development stands in stark contrast to the guiding principle of social solidarity and the concept of participatory justice. This is all the more true as the lives of people at the top and bottom of the income and wealth scales become increasingly alienated, resulting in new forms of arrogance among the winners and humiliation for those left behind.
The reasons for the intensification of social inequality are manifold. Technological, economic, and especially political developments play a significant role. The central source of income for the majority of the population – earned income – has developed problematically over the last four decades. This is particularly evident in the example of the USA. There, labor productivity increased by around 70 percent between 1979 and 2019, but this led to increased fragmentation in the labor market. Simpler jobs, including those in industry, disappeared, while highly skilled workers and white-collar jobs were among the winners. Against this backdrop, real hourly wages for the bottom half of the income distribution stagnated, better-paying jobs saw moderate increases, while the share of the top one percent in total income doubled. In Germany and other industrialized countries, this development was slower but proceeded in the same direction: alongside declining wage shares, there is an increasing precarity of low-skilled jobs, particularly in the growing service sector, characterized by fixed-term contracts, higher rates of part-time work, and other factors contributing to increasing insecurity (cf. Graeber 2018).
Alongside these changes in the income structure from employment, the global economy has undergone a “financialization.” This means not only the far above-average growth of the financial sector, but also the pervasiveness of financial logic across all economic sectors. With regard to investment decisions, shareholder value orientation has clearly gained priority, characterized by short-term return expectations and the reflection of these expectations in rising asset prices, usually rising stock prices. Thus, in most industrialized countries, the financial sector grew significantly faster than real gross domestic product. Furthermore, corporate profits increasingly flowed into share buybacks rather than investments. Private households, too, have become increasingly integrated into the financial system and its logic through mortgage loans and the strengthening of private retirement savings. This shift is associated with profound distributive effects. Private wealth has become an important source of economic security for more members of society than before. At the same time, employment and the income derived from it have lost relative significance. Those with little wealth and dependent on earned income – as in all industrialized nations more than half the population – are among the losers of this development, while groups with higher incomes and wealth benefited, thereby entrenching and intensifying inequality.
Parallel to these technological and economic developments, political decisions of recent decades have intensified the trend toward social inequality. Neoliberal policy concepts acted in accordance with these economic changes and declared corresponding decisions to be “objective necessity.” Thus, by lowering direct taxes, especially for top earners, and simultaneously increasing indirect sales taxes, they significantly contributed to exacerbating social inequality in the respective countries – beginning first with Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain. Even though this policy has been implemented in a considerably more moderate manner in Germany since the late 1980s, a heightening of social inequality due to political decisions can also be observed there. As a result, the tax legislation of recent decades in almost all industrialized countries has provided relief to high-income earners, while higher value-added taxes have tended to place a greater burden on low and middle-income earners. Corresponding to the outlined economic and political changes, a shift in values can also be observed at the cultural level: “Inequality lost its scandalous character, financial markets were declared the place of efficient allocation, and political shaping was replaced by a rhetoric of objective necessity” (Thibes 2026). In light of these developments, the question arises as to what perspectives for response can be derived from the guiding principle of social solidarity and the concept of participatory justice.
II.2. Tax policy as an instrument for strengthening the state’s capacity to act
The opportunities for participation, especially for disadvantaged people, and the quality of life for all members of society depend significantly on a capable state. In addition to protecting against violence and upholding the rule of law, the state must ensure high-quality infrastructure – technical infrastructure including mobility, but also educational and healthcare facilities, among others – and a needs-based and participation-oriented social security system. The state’s financial resources play a central role in fulfilling these tasks. Only a capable state can counteract the division of society and the strong tendencies to exclude disadvantaged people. By advocating for social solidarity and equal opportunities for all, Christian social ethics contributes to the discussion about whether and how the state can fulfill these tasks, and in particular, how it can implement a more socially equitable social policy.
A key answer to these questions lies in the prospect of a fairer tax system. This is necessary, on the one hand, to stabilize the state’s capacity to act, and on the other hand, it is an appropriate instrument for strengthening social balance and thus social cohesion. Already in the biblical writings, the obligation to pay taxes is seen in both the Old and New Testaments as an expression of loyalty to a state that ensures justice and peace (cf., for example, Romans 13:6-7). The strong emphasis on the social responsibility of property in the Old Testament, as expressed in the social legislation of Deuteronomy (cf. especially Deuteronomy 15), is exceptional compared to other contexts. This impulse has always played a special role, particularly in the Protestant tradition. According to John Calvin, taxes are “the property of the whole people,” not the “personal property” of princes or magistrates; otherwise, they would be a form of “tyrannical robbery.” Therefore, he described taxes as “a means to meet public needs” (Institutes IV, 20, 13). These formulations explicitly express the expectation of the provision of public goods. The demands placed on a high-performing state are all the more justified from the perspective of people facing multiple social disadvantages, as they depend on a reliable infrastructure more than other social groups, for example, in the areas of children’s and young people’s education, healthcare, and mobility. If one understands poverty primarily as a lack of participation, i.e., limited opportunities to achieve one’s own goals, then, in line with the concept of participatory justice, the aim must be to open up social opportunities for all members of society. This is an essential function of tax policy. From the perspective of liberal egalitarianism, disadvantages must also be compensated for in this way with the goal of “limiting permissible inequality” (Gosepath 2004, 458). This occurs primarily “within the framework of a system of compensatory tax redistribution” (ibid., 460). Furthermore, excessive financing of government tasks through debt is problematic from the perspective of intergenerational fairness, as this places a one-sided burden on future generations.
Thus, a crucial instrument for securing solidarity within society, both between generations and in social interaction, is taxation. The conviction that the better-off have a particular responsibility is deeply rooted in the socio-ethical tradition of both the Bible and the Christian churches. Against the backdrop of increasing social inequality in income and wealth in almost all industrialized countries, adjustments to tax policy are necessary to mitigate growing disparities. With regard to income, this means considering corresponding changes to income taxation, and with regard to wealth, reforms to inheritance taxes.
In this sense, an increase in the top income tax rate is initially plausible, as it fundamentally represents a socially just and productive source of revenue for the state budget. This also includes appropriately taxing unearned income from capital assets (including capital gains from Bitcoin). An increase in inheritance taxes can be justified even more convincingly. Unequal resource distributions, even from a liberal perspective, can only be legitimized if they are based on personal choices and attributable responsibility. Significant inequalities resulting from random external circumstances – not least when, where, and by whom one is born – are, however, only justifiable to a limited extent. Since inequalities are largely reproduced socially, and external circumstances such as the “randomness” of one’s birthplace play a major role, periodic redistribution between generations is essential. Inheritance tax is an obvious instrument for concretizing this principle of justice: Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous New Deal, which significantly contributed to overcoming the social consequences of the Great Depression in the USA, was also financed to a considerable degree by the staggered increase of inheritance tax to up to 70% (cf. Folsom 2006).
In general, a sustainable tax and fiscal policy should be implemented, designed so that all citizens “contribute according to their ability to pay, with their different types of income… This must apply in particular to the economic and social elites, who possess substantial wealth and can thus serve as role models for others. Tax morale reflects one’s relationship to the state and the acceptance of the social order” (EKD 2009, 45 f).
Outlook
In many industrialized nations, increasing social inequality, coupled with precarious employment and growing national debt, is leading to the erosion of social and cultural achievements. These developments have been significantly exacerbated by neoliberal policy concepts, which have contributed to the social and cultural legitimization of inequality. As a political consequence, the last two decades have seen a rise in right-wing populist and authoritarian political movements, often characterized by anti-democratic aims. To restore confidence in the state’s capacity to act and thus in the democratic order, the fundamental social compensation and safety net systems must be stabilized (cf. Detel 2025), supplemented by the necessary ecological transformation. As this article has attempted to demonstrate, this corresponds to the biblical ideal of social solidarity and the theological-socio-ethical concept of participatory justice. As a currently relevant concrete measure, tax policy must be reformed more strongly in line with its compensatory functions. From the multitude of possible measures, this article presents suggestions for income and inheritance taxation that are suitable for mitigating or even limiting economic inequality.[5]
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[1] The Tamar narrative in Genesis 38 can be used as an instructive example of justice in the sense of community loyalty, where Tamar’s behavior towards Judah is described as “just” (verse 26) (cf. Thiel 2003, 20 f).
[2] The Gini coefficient is a globally used measure for determining social inequality. A value of “0” would indicate perfect equality in areas such as income or wealth, while a value of “1” would indicate that all wealth would be concentrated in one person. In Germany, the Gini coefficient for household incomes, based on the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), has risen rather moderately in recent years to 0.31; however, this is the highest value since the SOEP began in 1984.
[3] The impact of taxes, levies and transfer payments on the Gini coefficient in Germany has been approximately 0.015 to 0.02 points for about ten years.
[4] The available data on wealth is insufficient in almost all countries, which explains the uncertainty in these figures.
[5] Similar concepts are advocated by various authors and movements, most notably Michael Sandel and Thomas Piketty.