Systems Sociology and Embodied Lifelines
In the science-religion dialogue, we cannot disregard the socio-cultural functions of scientific thinking and its empirical observations. A sociological approach to science and its socio-cultural spectrum should be integrated into the project of constructing a public theology of science, one that critically analyzes material interests and power relations within the social stratification in which the scientific community is embedded. I have a series dedicated to addressing the relationship between science and sociology, with a particular focus on Niklas Luhmann’s sociology and systems biology grounded in autopoiesis within cellular networks. Through this journey, I seek to bring significant insights to bear on the relevance of public theology of science and the integrity of the life-world, all for the sake of the common good and human dignity.
Paradigm Shift and Sociology of Science
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shift suggests that scientific revolutions occur through a transition from an established scientific framework to a new model capable of resolving persistent anomalies, thereby challenging the prevailing paradigm. This shift entails an epistemological rupture within the entire constellation of beliefs, values, and methodologies shared by members of a scientific community.[1]
Such a rupture moves toward a creative new synthesis, offering a fertile approach for examining the sociology of science and the construction of scientific knowledge. A genealogy of paradigms enables the integration of social inquiry into the scientific domain, as paradigms are shaped by their socio-cultural contexts and influenced by underlying power relations. Scientific research programs, therefore, are deeply intertwined with material realities, political structures, and the legitimacy of scientific meta-discourses.
Therefore, the sociology of science—also referred to as the sociology of scientific knowledge—seeks to examine a wide range of scientific and social issues, particularly the impact of scientific epistemes and technologies on socio-cultural life. In turn, sociological inquiry explores how scientific ideas and research programs are embedded within specific political and economic contexts. An epistemic stance within a sociological frame of reference analyzes the social conditions that shape scientific discourse—such as privilege, authority, and prestige—especially in relation to the structure and functioning of scientific research programs.[2]
Niklas Luhmann, a German sociologist, initiated a paradigmatic shift toward systems sociology by adopting the biological concept of autopoiesis. The term autopoiesis is derived from the Greek autos (self) and poiesis (making, or creation), signifying the autonomy of self-organizing systems. Originally coined by Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana and his student Francisco Varela, the concept was developed to describe how biological systems—such as cells—maintain and reproduce themselves through circular, self-referential processes.[3]
Luhmann appropriates the concept of autopoiesis—originally developed to describe self-organizing living systems—to conceptualize his systemic approach to sociology. His theory marks a paradigmatic shift from an anthropocentric model to a systems-based model centered on communication.
Systems Sociology and Autopoiesis
Luhmann draws on the biological concept of self-organization to construct a general framework of systems operating through processes and networks. He further integrates elements of Husserl’s phenomenology—particularly the notions of sense, meaning, and horizon—into a cybernetic framework. As Luhmann notes, “The form in which consciousness executes its operations is called by Husserl (in connection to Brentano) intentionality,” and “Intentionality is nothing but the positing of a difference.”[4]
In this view, intentionality becomes the foundational operation: a sense emerges by differentiating itself from the broader horizon of its environment. For example, a ship exists within its horizon—but it realizes its function through movement. It is not confined to its immediate location, as its horizon represents a field of possibilities. Sense-making, in this context, involves the dynamic interplay between the actual and the possible within the horizon of the sea. In Husserlian terms, sense implies a unity that emerges from the differentiation between the actual and the possible.
Luhmann builds on this by defining sense through the distinction between self-reference and other-reference. Social systems operate within the medium of sense and are constituted by this dual reference: self-reference pertains to the system’s internal operations, while other-reference relates to its orientation toward external elements. The actualization of one always implies correlation with the other. Luhmann thus synthesizes the biological concept of autopoiesis with social systems theory, aligning it with a phenomenological understanding of self-organization—emphasizing autonomy, operational closure, and the self-generative nature of systems.
Autopoiesis and Embodied Cognition
Varela develops his neurophenomenology of autopoiesis as a model of the autonomy and self-creation of living systems, aiming to expand the understanding of life as a unified, systemic organization. The autopoietic theory offers a novel approach to the biology of cognition, bridging it with the phenomenology of perception, particularly as articulated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Interpreted through Merleau-Ponty, the autopoietic principle suggests that the body is not merely a biological entity but the foundational site of cognition and lived experience, embedded within the Lebenswelt (life-world). As Merleau-Ponty beautifully puts it, “all the living relationships of experience” are gathered together “as a fisherman’s net drawn up from the depths of the ocean, quivering with fish and seaweed.”[5]
As Merleau-Ponty states, “To return to the things themselves is to return to the world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks… [a human being] is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself.”[6]
This foundational phenomenological insight underscores the primacy of lived experience and embodiment, positioning the human subject not as a detached observer, but as an embedded participant in the world.
For Varela, the organism and its space-time horizon occupy center stage in human cognition, which is fundamentally embodied within the life-world. In this context, right action or ethical praxis—in the Aristotelian sense—comes to the fore. This reflects the core of embodied cognitive science, which integrates life and cognition within the full situatedness of the organism in its environment. The significance of the organism—or social agency—is understood in terms of its embeddedness as an integrated unit, grounded within a vast network of historical, social, and environmental relationships.
This epistemic stance reaffirms an organism-centered view of life, aligning closely with Steven Rose’s critical theory of lifelines. Varela’s cognitive science embodies this perspective, emphasizing the dynamic, embodied, and situated nature of cognition. It stands in clear opposition to reductionist models such as the selfish gene theory or other genetically deterministic accounts of life.[7]
The organismic approach offers a biological understanding of evolution, cognition, and embodiment by emphasizing the implications of autopoiesis for the functioning of the nervous system in relation to human praxis. This perspective challenges the traditional view that the nervous system encodes the external environment through internal representations. Instead of passively reflecting an external reality, representation is understood as a dynamic process aimed at enabling the organism’s adaptive engagement with its environment.
By contrast, Varela views the nervous system as a unitary, recursive network situated within an autonomous, self-regulating (homeodynamic) organism—constantly engaged in a dynamic flow of action embedded in its environment. In this systemic framework, cognition is not about internal representation but about bringing forth meaning through the organism’s ontogenetic and phylogenetic lifelines.
For example, colors are not objective properties waiting to be represented internally; rather, they are enacted and embodied within a situated ecological life-world, perceptually shaped by the organism’s bodily interaction and movement. Varela’s cognitive science departs sharply from adaptationist and representationalist models of life and cognition.
Varela’s position is known as the enactive approach, which seeks to integrate mind and body, as well as body and environment. It emphasizes the dynamic relationship between purposeful agency and the surrounding environment in the co-creation of a shared social world.[8]
The life-world is brought forth through the agent’s ongoing interaction with the environment, highlighting the embodied, situated nature of cognition. In this context, Husserl’s notion of the life-world resonates with the web of life—conceived as an ecological theatre in which meaning and experience are enacted.
Indeed, systems thinking aligns closely with ecology, understood as the study of the oikos—the household—interconnected with all members of the Earth community. Ecology is the science that explores the relationships between organisms and their environments, emphasizing the interconnectedness and dynamic interactions that constitute ecosystems as networks. In this ecological theatre, communities of animals and plants interact with their physical surroundings, giving rise to a renewed understanding of oikos as an ecological unit. The science of ecology thus enriches systems thinking by emphasizing community, network patterns, and the complexity of ecological functioning.[9]
In Aristotelian philosophy, oikos refers to all members living within a household, governed by the economic system of oikonomia—the management of the household aimed at sustaining life. This stands in contrast to chrematistike, the art of wealth accumulation, in which the circulation and exchange of money becomes central as a means of generating riches rather than meeting basic needs.[10]
In Aristotle’s conception of ethical praxis, there is a synthesis of oikos and oikonomia that revitalizes an ecological way of thinking centered on justice for the common good. Human praxis is purposeful action that encompasses self-realization (entelechy) within the life of the polis. Poiesis denotes the process of producing something as its outcome—such as the construction of oikos.
Maturana and Varela seek to bridge these concepts through the notion of autopoiesis, which signifies autonomy and creativity in the construction of oikos. Furthermore, Francisco Varela extends the concept of autopoiesis beyond the biological domain, emphasizing its broader organizational significance in understanding diverse social systems.[11] He highlights the role of praxis informed by phronesis (prudence), wherein right action is embodied, resonating with principles found in Buddhist meditation.
[1] Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 175.
[2] Bourdieu, “The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions of the progress of reason,” Social Science Information 14 (6), 19-47.
[3] Maturana, “Autopoiesis.” In Autopoiesis: A Theory of Living Organizations, 21-32.
[4] Ibid., 31.
[5] Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, XV.
[6] Ibid., ix. xi.
[7] “An Interview with Francisco Varela,” Wild Duck Review, 2000.
[8] Thompson and Varela, “Autopoiesis and Lifelines,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1999) 22, 909.
[9] Patten, “Network Ecology”, in Higashi and Burns, Theoretical Studies of Ecosystems.
[10] Aristotle, Politics, I, 11, 1258b, 33–34.
[11] Varela, “Describing the Logic of the Living,” in Autopoiesis, 36-48.